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Researchers can spend their time reverse engineering, performing reverse 
analysis, or making substantive contributions to digital forensics science. 
Although work in all of these areas is important, it is the scientific 
breakthroughs that are the most critical for addressing the challenges that we 
face. 
Reverse Engineering is the traditional bread-and-butter of digital forensics 
research. Companies like Microsoft and Apple deliver computational artifacts 
(operating systems, applications and phones) to the commercial market. These 
artifacts are bought and used by billions. Some have evil intent, and (if society 
is lucky), the computers end up in the hands of law enforcement. Unfortunately 
the original vendors rarely provide digital forensics tools that make their 
systems amenable to analysis by law enforcement. Hence the need for reverse 
engineering. 
There is no legal requirement for the cell phone makers to support data 
extraction or to help us to understand the extracted data. As a result, the 
developers of forensic tools must painstakingly reverse engineer cable pinouts, 
master the hardware, software and data layouts of phones, figure out ways to 
extract data from devices, decipher the meaning of each binary field, and track 
arbitrary (and frequently undocumented) vendor changes. The same problems 
are played out in reverse engineering application programs, file formats, over-
the-wire protocols, proprietary file systems, and indeed the vast majority of 
information that is processed by modern computer forensics tools. 
Much of this reverse engineering effort is best described as “file cabinet 
forensics.” That is, the reverse engineers are trying to figure out information 
that’s locked away in vendor file cabinets (or file servers). It would certainly be 
a lot easier to have the vendors provide their design documents, specifications 
and source code that’s in their file cabinets, rather than trying to decipher those 
bits without technical assistance. But there is no way to compel the vendors to 
yield their secrets. 
The situation faced by police investigators (and thus by forensic developers) 
today is similar to the situation that law enforcement faced in the early 1990s 
when attempting to execute wiretaps on cell phone networks. Although the 
wireless companies of the time were legally required to provide law 
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enforcement with help, they were not required to design or deploy systems that 
were technically capable of meeting law enforcements’ requirement.  
Faced on the one hand with equipment that was not “wiretap-ready” and on the 
other hand with wiretap orders, providers were forced to come up with creative 
back doors to let law enforcement conduct voice intercepts on their deployed 
networks. In New York City, for example, AT&T gave the FBI access to 
cellular networks through the use of “technical ports” that had been created for 
servicing the switches. But there weren’t enough ports to satisfy the demand, 
and a significant backlog built up.
1
 
In the 1994 Congress addressed the wiretap issue with the Communications 
Assistance to Law Enforcement Act. Passed over the objection of civil 
libertarians, CALEA created a $10,000-per-day fine for companies that sell 
voice communications equipment into the US market that cannot be 
wiretapped. Today, as a result, the US has a telephone infrastructure that offers 
no privacy against court-ordered intercepts, and the technology is available 
world-wide, to democracies and totalitarian regimes alike.  
 (Clearly, allowing for lawful access can be a double-edged sword. We would 
ideally like a system that provides law enforcement access in a manner that is 
fully audited and not subject to abuse. Instead, the technology has clearly been 
misused, as it was in Greece in 2005
2
. But that, alas, would best be discussed in 
another article.) 
Unfortunately, reverse engineering is ultimately a no-win game for digital 
forensics. That’s because there are more people building new digital artifacts 
than reversing the artifacts currently in use. Forensic researchers simply can’t 
keep up. For this reason, I believe that we will need to address this problem 
legislatively, as we did with CALEA, and reserve our reverse-engineering 
capabilities for developers who operate outside the law—for example, malware 
authors. 
Beyond mere reverse engineering, there is a world of research that needs to be 
done. My concern is that researchers are now spending so much effort on 
reverse engineering that other important research is being delayed or deferred, 
as that other work requires the benefits of file cabinet forensics to be practical. 
Consider the case of the location information stored within smart phones and 
GPS devices. Such information can be of great use in a criminal investigation, 
and it is widely acknowledged that there is a wealth of location information 
                                                 
1
 See “Snoops are vexed by digital era,” S. Garfinkel, The Boston Globe, 1991, for a 
discussion of the problems faced by law enforcement at the time. 
http://simson.net/clips/1991/1991.Globe.Digital_Telephany.pdf 
2
 Prevelakis, V. & Spinellis, D. (2007, July). The Athens Affair. IEEE Spectrum, 44(7), 
26-33. 
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that is not immediately visible through the user interfaces that these machines 
provide. Although vendors know about the information that their machines 
explicitly record, there is other information that is inadvertently captured or 
improperly erased. That information can only found with work beyond basic 
reverse engineering—finding that information requires reverse analysis.  
A good example of reverse analysis was the discovery of the iPhone tracking 
database. This data, which was used by computer forensics examiners for more 
than a year, was widely publicized in April 2011
3
 and soon corrected by Apple. 
At this incident illustrates, reverse analysis can produce discoveries are useful, 
but their use can be fleeting, as many correspond to bugs and privacy violations 
in consumer products which vendors will be highly motivated to correct. Zero-
day exploits are and good example of the fruits of reverse analysis.  
It’s my belief that the biggest multiplier for digital forensics research comes 
not from reverse engineering or reverse analysis, but from the development of 
new techniques that transcend the specifics of the systems being analyzed. 
Such techniques are powerful because they can be applied to a wide range of 
digital artifacts, rather than to the specific system being analyzed. 
A good example here is the development of a technique for finding AES keys 
in memory through the analysis of the key schedule.
4
 Another example is my 
program, bulk_extractor, which uses opportunistic decompression to search for 
features in compressed data. Both of ideas that can be generally applied to a 
range of different situations, creating powerful capabilities that can be applied 
to many different devices. 
What’s both exciting and frustrating about digital forensics is that we need 
constant work in reverse engineering, reverse analysis, and underlying science 
in order to make progress against a problem that keeps getting harder. Like a 
person on a treadmill, we need to run just to stay in place. That’s because our 
adversary is not just the bad guys—it’s also the multitude of developers. For 
this reason, I hope that in the future we will turn more to legislation to solve 
these “file cabinet forensics” problems. After all, it’s more efficient to get the 
data out of file cabinets, rather than resorting to reverse engineering. 
 
                                                 
3 Allan, A. & Warden, P. (2011, April). iPhone Tracker. 
http://petewarden.github.com/iPhoneTracker/ 
4 Halderman, J.A., Schoen, S.D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, 
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